The Ontic-Epistemic Distinction: Implications for General Intelligence

The current pursuit of robust machine intelligence is largely predicated on a substrate independent, computational functionalist view of cognition, where sufficiently complex computational processing is expected to eventually yield generalized reasoning. This paper explores the ontological distinctions between these computational frameworks and biological cognition, specifically how these differences impact the capacity for semantic understanding. By analyzing phenomena such as the "reversal curse" where models fail to generalize the symmetry in identity relations (A=B implies B=A), and performance on novel reasoning benchmarks (e.g., ARC-AGI), this paper examines whether current model limitations are transient artifacts of scale or indicative of a distinct architectural category. Integrating Stevan Harnad’s “symbol grounding problem” with Evan Thompson’s biological model of “intrinsic normativity,” I investigate whether robust general intelligence might require sense-making: a process distinct from information processing, whereby an agent’s internal states are causally coupled with its environment via survival or system-wide stakes which grounds symbols in meaning. Current Large Language Models (LLMs) appear to lack this intrinsic normativity, and consequently may operate primarily as epistemic instruments rather than ontic agents. By introducing the concept of “ontic grounding”, this paper presents a potential framework for distinguishing between the simulation of reasoning and true understanding, which could have implications for AI safety and governance.