SNPeek: Side-Channel Analysis for Privacy Applications on Confidential VMs
Abstract
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. But CVMs are not a privacy panacea, as they are vulnerable to side-channel attacks that may compromise confidentially of workloads.
In this work, we develop the FARFETCH’D framework to help developers evaluate side-channel assisted privacy attacks that are broadly applicable to CVMs. The privacy reduction due to these attacks heavily depend on the execution environment and the workload, which varies vastly:What are avail-able attack primitives? How does the particular privacy work-load behave?This makes manual investigation and efficiently mitigating software-based side channels a cumbersome and impossible task. FARFETCH’D solves this challenge by providing a set of configurable attack primitives that can execute on real CVM hardware and automated ML-based analysis pipelines. We evaluate the effectiveness of FARFETCH’D on privacy-preserving workloads. Our results show that our approach is effective at pinpointing the vulnerability of privacy apps against side channels and help evaluating mitigation based on oblivious memory and differential privacy.
In this work, we develop the FARFETCH’D framework to help developers evaluate side-channel assisted privacy attacks that are broadly applicable to CVMs. The privacy reduction due to these attacks heavily depend on the execution environment and the workload, which varies vastly:What are avail-able attack primitives? How does the particular privacy work-load behave?This makes manual investigation and efficiently mitigating software-based side channels a cumbersome and impossible task. FARFETCH’D solves this challenge by providing a set of configurable attack primitives that can execute on real CVM hardware and automated ML-based analysis pipelines. We evaluate the effectiveness of FARFETCH’D on privacy-preserving workloads. Our results show that our approach is effective at pinpointing the vulnerability of privacy apps against side channels and help evaluating mitigation based on oblivious memory and differential privacy.
