- Alexis David Jacq
- Julien Perolat
- Matthieu Geist
- Olivier Pietquin
Abstract
This paper extends the notion of equilibrium in game theory to learning algorithms in repeated stochastic games. We define a learning equilibrium as an algorithm used by a population of players, such that no player can individually use an alternative algorithm and increase its asymptotic score. We introduce Foolproof Cooperative Learning (FCL), an algorithm that converges to a Tit-for-Tat behavior. It allows cooperative strategies when played against itself while being not exploitable by selfish players. We prove that in repeated symmetric games, this algorithm is a learning equilibrium. We illustrate the behavior of FCL on symmetric matrix and grid games, and its robustness to selfish learners.
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