Renato Paes Leme
Renato Paes Leme is a research scientist at Google New York. He is broadly interested in algorithm design, specially for problems on the interface between Economics and Computation. Some topics he is particularly excited about are: mechanism design for non-quasi-linear settings, Price of Anarchy of auctions, sequential games and applications of game-theory to ad auctions. See http://renatoppl.com/ for my personal homepage.
Research Areas
Authored Publications
Sort By
Google
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru Varadaraja
Christopher Liaw
Haihao (Sean) Lu
Andres Perlroth
Georgios Piliouras
Ariel Schvartzman
Kelly Spendlove
Hanrui Zhang
Mingfei Zhao
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 22 (2024)
Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems
Georgios Piliouras
Kelly Spendlove
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2024)
Mechanism Design for Large Language Models
Paul Duetting
Haifeng Xu
Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2024, Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 144–155
Calibrated Click-Through Auctions
Dirk Bergemann
Paul Duetting
Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022, pp. 47-57
Secretaries with Advice
Paul Duetting
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'21) (2021), pp. 409-429
Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), SIAM, pp. 1357-1373
Contextual Recommendations and Low-Regret Cutting-Plane Algorithms
Guru Prashanth Guruganesh
NeurIPS (2021)
