SAC133 - SSAC Comments on Proposed Root KSK Algorithm Rollover
Abstract
The SSAC supports the transition from RSA with SHA-256 (Algorithm 8) to ECDSA P-256
with SHA-256 (Algorithm 13) as the cryptographic algorithm for the RootKSK. The root zone
has relied on RSA-based algorithms since DNSSEC signing began in 2010. The algorithm did
not change during the first KSK rollover in 2018 or during the second rollover currently
underway and scheduled to complete in October 2026. Establishing a clear and predictable
process for algorithm transitions is essential to the long-term security of the root zone, and the
SSAC observes that the proposal addresses the Recommendation 23 of the SSR2 Review
accordingly.
The SSAC notes that the proposal builds upon the Root Zone DNSSEC Algorithm Rollover
Study published by ICANN in May 2024, which assessed resolver and authoritative server
support for alternative algorithms, analyzed rollover methodologies, and evaluated operational
risks. The SSAC finds that the proposal implements the study’s recommendations. The SSAC also notes that this proposal is consistent with the SSAC’s prior work on DNSSEC key rollover,
including SAC063, SAC073, SAC102, and SAC108.
The SSAC encourages ICANN to proceed with this rollover. Specific comments on the
proposal’s methodology, timeline, and operational readiness follow
with SHA-256 (Algorithm 13) as the cryptographic algorithm for the RootKSK. The root zone
has relied on RSA-based algorithms since DNSSEC signing began in 2010. The algorithm did
not change during the first KSK rollover in 2018 or during the second rollover currently
underway and scheduled to complete in October 2026. Establishing a clear and predictable
process for algorithm transitions is essential to the long-term security of the root zone, and the
SSAC observes that the proposal addresses the Recommendation 23 of the SSR2 Review
accordingly.
The SSAC notes that the proposal builds upon the Root Zone DNSSEC Algorithm Rollover
Study published by ICANN in May 2024, which assessed resolver and authoritative server
support for alternative algorithms, analyzed rollover methodologies, and evaluated operational
risks. The SSAC finds that the proposal implements the study’s recommendations. The SSAC also notes that this proposal is consistent with the SSAC’s prior work on DNSSEC key rollover,
including SAC063, SAC073, SAC102, and SAC108.
The SSAC encourages ICANN to proceed with this rollover. Specific comments on the
proposal’s methodology, timeline, and operational readiness follow
Research Areas
