Causal Armor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attribution

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to \emph{Indirect Prompt Injection} (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within \emph{untrusted} content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the \emph{over-defense dilemma}: they deploy expensive, \emph{always-on} sanitization that degrades utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through an operational causal lens: a successful injection manifests as a \emph{grounding collapse} where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment provides disproportionate marginal support. Based on this signature, we propose \texttt{CausalArmor}, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, normalized leave-one-out attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs \emph{retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking} to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned" reasoning traces. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses with explainability while preserving utility and latency of AI agents.