Willem de Bruijn

Willem de Bruijn

Willem joined Google in 2011 as a kernel developer. Before that, he built research operating systems in academia. At Cornell University he co-developed Nexus, a microkernel operating system that derives authorization from application invariants on confidentiality and integrity. At the Vrije University of Amsterdam he received his PhD for research on a high-throughput network stack and its application in intrusion detection. As Bachelor and Master student at Leiden University he implemented active and p2p networks.

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Authored Publications
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    Preview abstract We describe our experience with Fathom, a system for identifying the network performance bottlenecks of any service running in the Google fleet. Fathom passively samples RPCs, the principal unit of work for services. It segments the overall latency into host and network components with kernel and RPC stack instrumentation. It records these detailed latency metrics, along with detailed transport connection state, for every sampled RPC. This lets us determine if the completion is constrained by the client, network or server. To scale while enabling analysis, we also aggregate samples into distributions that retain multi-dimensional breakdowns. This provides us with a macroscopic view of individual services. Fathom runs globally in our datacenters for all production traffic, where it monitors billions of TCP connections 24x7. For five years Fathom has been our primary tool for troubleshooting service network issues and assessing network infrastructure changes. We present case studies to show how it has helped us improve our production services. View details
    Logical Attestation: An Authorization Architecture for Trustworthy Computing
    Emin Gün Sirer
    Patrick Reynolds
    Alan Shieh
    Kevin Walsh
    Dan Williams
    Fred B. Schneider
    Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles, ACM, New York, NY, USA(2011)
    Preview abstract This paper describes the design and implementation of a new operating system authorization architecture to support trustworthy computing. Called logical attestation, this architecture provides a sound framework for reasoning about run time behavior of applications. Logical attestation is based on attributable, unforgeable statements about program properties, expressed in a logic. These statements are suitable for mechanical processing, proof construction, and verification; they can serve as credentials, support authorization based on expressive authorization policies, and enable remote principals to trust software components without restricting the local user’s choice of binary implementations. We have implemented logical attestation in a new operating system called the Nexus. The Nexus executes natively on x86 platforms equipped with secure coprocessors. It supports both native Linux applications and uses logical attestation to support new trustworthy-computing applications. When deployed on a trustworthy cloud-computing stack, logical attestation is efficient, achieves high-performance, and can run applications that provide qualitative guarantees not possible with existing modes of attestation. View details